ALLOCATING THE RISK OF FRAUD
IN A NO SELLER INDEMNITY TRANSACTION
Emily Kay Gould*
I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers who practice in the area of mergers and acquisitions
(“M&A”) have two main goals—close the transaction according to the
client’s expectations and minimize post-closing liability for their client.
The introduction of representation and warranty insurance (“RWI”) into
the M&A landscape provides attorneys with one tool to help them achieve
these goals. The parties can also allocate the risk of post-closing liability in
the purchase agreement. This includes an allocation of the risk of fraud
claims that arise after the transaction’s closing. A hypothetical asset
purchase transaction helps to illustrate the interaction of RWI and fraud
in M&A transactions and the vital role that M&A drafters have in
rebalancing transactional risk in the event of fraud.1
Imagine representing Sarah Smith, the founder and sole owner of
the Delaware corporation, Makeup Tech, Inc., which supplies makeup
cartridges for a popular new makeover device. Makeup Tech was recently
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Heminway for her helpful guidance in preparing this article, along with the editors and
staff of Transactions: The Tennessee Journal of Business Law for their editing efforts.
The author also expresses thanks to attorneys at Polsinelli who first exposed her to
representations and warranties insurance in the context of no seller indemnity
transactions.
1 This article focuses on asset purchase transactions involving a state-chartered
statutory business entity as both seller and buyer. Similar principles apply to other types
of M&A transactions involving business entity sellers and buyers.
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granted a patent on a particular feature of its cartridge, which prevents
leakage of the makeup between applications. Makeup Tech supplies these
cartridges to makeup companies, including Face at the Table, Inc., one of
the leading makeup brands for the modern professional. To date, Face at
the Table is the most popular brand for these cartridges, and the
manufacturer of the makeover device encourages its users to purchase
Face at the Table, largely because of the cartridge’s anti-leak properties.
Smith has been approached by a private equity firm (the “Buyer”)
with an offer to buy substantially all of the assets of her business. Smith is
well connected with other founders who have sold their businesses with
“no strings attached,” and she is only willing to sell if the Buyer will agree
to a no seller indemnity transaction. Because you are familiar with the
workings of her business and you have some experience with M&A, she
has asked you to represent her on this asset purchase transaction.
The Buyer is familiar with the concept of no seller indemnity,
having utilized this type of transaction itself on the sell side. Knowing that
there are several other potential bidders, the Buyer agrees to utilize
representation

and

warranty

insurance

to

cover

breaches

of

representations and warranties. With limited exceptions (for fundamental
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representations2 and fraud), there will be no seller indemnity. The Buyer
expressly disclaims reliance on representations and warranties made
outside the four corners of the purchase agreement. The parties agree
(through an integration clause) that the purchase agreement is the
complete agreement between the parties as to the asset purchase. They
forego an escrow, and the buyer’s exclusive remedy in the event of a
breach of the seller’s representations and warranties is recovery under the
RWI policy. Claims for fraud and for breaches of fundamental
representations are excepted from the exclusive remedies provision.
Shortly after closing, another manufacturer of makeup cartridges
files a post-grant review request with the USPTO to challenge Makeup
Tech’s patent. Subsequently, the USPTO determines that the patent is
invalid and cancels it. Because Makeup Tech no longer has a monopoly
on the no leak technology, Face at the Table begins to seek cartridges from
other suppliers, and ultimately stops purchasing from Makeup Tech
altogether. This is a devastating loss to the recently acquired business.

2 Fundamental representations are given special treatment in the purchase agreement
and typically relate to the seller’s organizational status and legal capacity to complete the
transaction. Sean J. Griffith, Deal Insurance: Representation and Warranty Insurance in Mergers
and Acquisitions, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1839, 1855 (2020).
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Smith represented in the purchase agreement that there was no
pending or threatened litigation regarding the validity of the Makeup Tech
patent. However, a week before the closing, she had received an
important-looking letter in the mail addressed to Smith as the Chief
Executive Officer of Makeup Tech, Inc. from PatentTroll Corporation,
known by Smith to be a firm that regularly seeks to obtain rights relating
to patents for the purpose of benefiting through licensing or litigation. She
briefly considered opening the envelope because of the identity of the
sender; however, she determined that she needed to stay focused on
getting through the closing and was too busy to deal with its contents. As
a result, she tossed the letter into a pile on her desk and did not open it
until after the closing. If she had opened the letter, she would have learned
about the threatened patent challenge. While the RWI policy covered
some losses resulting from this breach of a non-fundamental
representation, it was not enough to make the Buyer whole.
The Buyer claims that Smith intentionally or, at least recklessly,
misrepresented information about the validity of the patent in the
purchase agreement. Smith denies that she intended to misrepresent
anything, but she does admit to seeing the letter in the mail. Will the Buyer
be able to sue Smith for fraudulent misrepresentation, even though the
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parties agreed to no seller indemnity? The answer depends, in large part,
on how the parties defined fraud in the purchase agreement.
Keeping the hypothetical described above in mind, this article
compares (a) the consequences of including a generalized fraud exception
(“carve-out”) to the indemnity and exclusive remedies provisions of an
asset purchase agreement without expressly defining “fraud” with (b)
drafting a fraud carve-out that specifically defines fraud according to the
parties’ intentions. The analysis proceeds in three additional parts,
followed by a summary conclusion; the remainder of this Introduction
describes each part briefly.
Part II provides background information about representations
and warranties in asset purchase agreements and the typical seller’s
indemnity for breach of those representations and warranties. It then
discusses the emergence of RWI and how this insurance product may be
used to replace the traditional seller’s representation and warranty
indemnity in an asset purchase transaction. Part II ends with a brief
description of the underwriting and claims processes for RWI.
Part III discusses fraud claims relating to asset purchase agreement
representations and warranties. It explains how representations and
warranties work together with other contract provisions to allocate the
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risk of post-closing fraud claims. These provisions include the integration
clause, the anti-reliance provision, the exclusive remedies provision, and
the fraud carve-out. Delaware decisional law helps to illuminate these
interactions and to emphasize the importance of careful drafting in this
area.
Part IV revisits the Makeup Tech hypothetical and discusses two
different scenarios that may arise depending on how the parties addressed
the fraud carveout in the asset purchase agreement. The treatment of fraud
in an asset purchase agreement significantly impacts the rights of both
sellers and buyers. From the seller’s perspective, an inarticulately drafted
fraud definition has the power to undermine carefully drafted integration,
anti-reliance, and exclusive remedies provisions, each of which is designed
to limit the seller’s post-closing liability. From the buyer’s perspective, the
treatment of fraud may determine whether or to what extent the buyer has
recourse in the event of a deal founded on fraudulent information.
The article concludes with an alternative idea about how to address
the definition of fraud in the purchase agreement. Wherever and however
the parties decide to address fraud in the purchase agreement, it is
important to keep in mind that fraud is a business issue that must be
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carefully assessed and negotiated.3 “Structuring to solve business issues—
and sorting out business issues resulting from the structure—is what
M&A is all about.”4 Lawyers must take care to identify and evaluate fraud
risk, and negotiate and draft contract provisions that accurately capture
the parties’ expectations about the availability of post-closing fraud claims.
If an agreement is unclear on the impact of fraud, the discovery of a
fraudulent representation will result in difficult enforcement and recovery
choices and outcomes for both parties.
II. BACKGROUND
This part provides background information necessary to
understand how RWI can be used in place of the typical seller’s indemnity
in an asset purchase agreement. Beginning with a description of relevant
characteristics of a traditional asset purchase agreement, this part discusses
the emergence of the “no seller indemnity” transaction. It concludes with
an overview of the history, purpose, and mechanics of RWI.

3 Mergers & Acquisitions Comm., A.B.A.: Bus. Law Section, Fraud Carve-Outs,
HOTSHOT, https://www.hotshotlegal.com/courses/fraud-carveouts/sections/926https://www.hotshotlegal.com/courses/fraud-carveouts/sections/926 (last visited Oct. 29, 2022) (interviewing Attorney Glenn West).
4 CHRISTOPHER S. HARRISON, MAKE THE DEAL: NEGOTIATING MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS 2 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2016).
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TRADITIONAL TRANSACTION WITH A SELLER’S INDEMNITY
In

a

typical

asset

purchase

transaction,

parties

make

representations and warranties about themselves and about the business
being acquired. This article focuses primarily on representations made by
the seller and its willingness (or unwillingness) to indemnify the buyer for
breaches of those representations. While the buyer also makes
representations, those tend to be less focused on the buyer’s business
operations and are not as heavily negotiated as the seller’s representations.5
i.

Representations and Warranties

In general, “representations are statements of fact [and] warranties
are promises that a stated fact is true.”6 They are sometimes referred to
collectively as representations or “reps.”7 In practice, representations
should be thought of as “risk allocation devices—not literal statements of
truth. A party may—and often does—make several reps believing them to

Lou R. Kling et al., Summary of Acquisition Agreements, 51 U. MIA. L. REV. 779, 783, 794
(1997) (noting that “[t]he purpose of the seller’s representations is to paint a picture of
the business being acquired,” whereas “[t]he seller’s prime motivation in obtaining
representations from the buyer is to know who it is dealing with, to understand exactly
what has to happen before the buyer can close the deal and to be as sure as possible
that on the day of closing the buyer can actually come up with the purchase price”).
6 Griffith, supra note 2, at 1840.
7 Id. at 1841; see e.g., HARRISON, supra note 4, at 57 (“Sellers or target businesses use
representations and warranties (referred to simply as ‘representations’ in this book) to
confirm important facts.”).
5
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be true, but without any way of determining (or any evidence supporting)
their actual truth.”8
Through the representations, the seller is compelled to provide
credible information about the business and its risks, which should
theoretically lead to an accurate and fair purchase price.9 The
representations are limited by knowledge10 and materiality qualifiers.11 The
seller often makes representations about corporate authority, corporate
structure, existing contracts, compliance with law, absence of litigation,
financial statements, environmental liabilities, intellectual property,
employee matters, customers or clients and suppliers, and the absence of
undisclosed liabilities.12 Items designated by the parties as fundamental
representations are given special treatment in the purchase agreement.13

8Mergers & Acquisitions Committee, A.B.A.: Bus. Law Section, Summary: Fraud CarveOuts, HOTSHOT, [hereinafter Summary: Fraud Carve-Outs],
https://www.hotshotlegal.com/courses/fraud-carve-outs/sections/926 (follow
“Summary” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 29, 2022).
9 Abraham J.B. Cable, Comment on Griffith’s Deal Insurance: The Continuing Scramble
Among Professionals, 104 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 75, 79 (2020).
10 See Kling et al., supra note 5, at 793 (“If the representation is qualified by a knowledge
limitation, the buyer, in order to recover damages, not only has to show that the
underlying representation was false, but also that the seller knew it to be so.”).
11 See id. (“[T]he buyer’s rights are not triggered unless there is a ‘material’ problem.”).
12 HARRISON, supra note 4, at 89–90 (“The wording of the representations will be quite
detailed, and the subject of technical drafting discussions.”); see also Kling et al., supra
note 5, at 780 (“Private companies do not have the same reporting requirements as
public companies, which creates a greater need for enhanced representations and
warranties.”).
13 See Griffith, supra note 2.
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Known exceptions to the representations (as well as important details too
voluminous for inclusion in the asset purchase agreement) are referenced
in the asset purchase agreement and listed on accompanying disclosure
schedules and do not form the basis of a breach.14 A seller tries to narrow
the scope and depth of its representations as much as possible, while a
buyer prefers broad representations that allow for expanded pre-closing
options and post-closing indemnity claims and adjustments.15 The buyer’s
right to sue or recover for a breach is limited by the survival periods set
forth in the agreement.16
ii.

Seller’s Indemnity

Representations that are made at the time of signing must be
materially accurate and complete at the time of closing as if made at that
time.17 If the parties become aware of a breach of the seller’s

HARRISON, supra note 4, at 61 (“[A]ny known issues would be disclosed by the target
in the disclosure schedules and, thus, would not constitute a breach. The seller may
separately indemnify the buyer through a special indemnity for a risk or liability that is
known and fully disclosed.”).
15 Id. at 90–91 (“If a buyer does not receive a particular representation, the courts may
conclude that it assumed that risk that it had adequately diligenced the issue and thus
did not need protection through the representations.”).
16 Id. at 251–52. The survival period for basic representations is typically one to two
years; however, “[f]undamental representations usually have longer survival periods,”
sometimes up to the applicable statute of limitations. Id.; see also Kling et al., supra note
5, at 805 (“Most representations will generally survive for one to two years, with those
relating to taxes, employee benefits, environmental issues and due authorization of the
transaction surviving significantly longer.”).
17 See HARRISON, supra note 4, at 89 (“By covering events as of the closing, the
representations can be prospective to that extent rather than merely historical—that is,
provide protection for changes that occur and make the representations false between
signing and closing.”); Kling, et al., supra note 5, at 799 (“The condition that the other
14
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representations before closing, the buyer may refuse to close or may
demand a re-negotiation of the terms of the transaction.18 However, if a
breach is discovered after closing, the buyer often seeks recovery under an
indemnity provided by the seller for that purpose.19 If the seller makes an
inaccurate representation that survives closing and the inaccuracy is
discovered during the survival period, the buyer may seek compensation
for the resulting losses or damages through the indemnity, subject to
agreed-upon limitations.20 Ultimately, the buyer’s ability to recover under
an indemnity comes down to the details of both the indemnification
provision and the representations and warranties themselves.21

party’s representations and warranties be true and correct at closing is generally the
most significant condition for both buyers and sellers. This ‘bringdown’ clause protects
each party from the other’s business changing or additional, unforeseen risks arising
before closing.”).
18 See HARRISON, supra note 4, at 62 (“[I]f the target faces a potential liability, the parties
may adjust the purchase price for the risk, draft closing conditions or related
termination rights tied to successfully fixing those matters, or provide a special
indemnity to protect the buyer from losses related to that liability.”); Kling et al., supra
note 5, at 783.
19 HARRISON, supra note 4, at 245 (“An indemnity is one mechanism for the buyer to
shift liabilities back to the seller.”). The parties often enter into an escrow agreement to
ensure payment of any indemnification claims. See id. at 249.
20 Id. at 61 (noting recovery may be limited by deductibles, caps on damages, and
restrictions on punitive or speculative damages).
21 HARRISON, supra note 4, at 95–96 (“[A]n indemnity renders every detail of the
representations and warranties critical, because it can mean the difference between the
seller having, or not having, to make post-closing indemnity payments to the buyer.”).
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NO SELLER INDEMNITY TRANSACTION WITH RWI

Some transactions deviate from the standard seller’s indemnity by
limiting or even replacing the seller’s liability for breaches of
representations and warranties with a RWI policy purchased by the buyer.
This is commonly referred to as a no seller indemnity RWI transaction.22
No seller indemnity transactions are also known as “public style”
transactions.23 In a no seller indemnity transaction, the representations and
warranties do not survive the closing.24 Aside from carve-outs for breaches
of fundamental representations and for fraud, the buyer’s exclusive
remedy in the case of a breach of representations and warranties is the
RWI policy.25 The history of RWI and its appeal to both buyers and sellers,

“No seller indemnity” is not the only way to refer to this type of deal. For example, it
is sometimes referred to as a “no-recourse deal.” Mergers & Acquisitions, A.B.A.: Bus.
Law Section, supra note 3.
23 See Griffith, supra note 2, at 1851 (“[I]n public company deals there is no indemnity,
and the reps do not survive the closing. Breaches of reps in public company deals thus
only matter if they are discovered prior to the closing and are sufficiently large to enable
the buyer at least to threaten not to close.”); Kling, et al., supra note 5, at 780 (noting
that in a public company acquisition, “unless an escrow or similar holdback device is
established, there is no way for the purchaser to obtain indemnification from public
shareholders.”).
24 Andrew J. Noreuil & Brian J. Massengill, Delaware Supreme Court Adopts ABRY
Partners Framework Permitting Limitations of Liability for Fraud Except for Intentional Fraud,
MAYER BROWN (March 1, 2021), https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/perspectivesevents/publications/2021/03/delaware-supreme-court-adopts-abry-partnersframework-permitting-limitations-of-liability-for-fraud-except-for-intentional-fraud (“In
effect, a no indemnity deal provides that the representations and warranties expire at
the closing of the transaction, and the buyer has no claim against the seller for breaches
of representations and warranties.”).
25 Id. (“The buyer often negotiates for the seller to be liable for breaches of
fundamental representations and for fraud, but otherwise agrees to have its
representations and warranties insurance policy be its exclusive remedy for breaches of
representations and warranties.”).
22
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together with information about the RWI underwriting and claims
processes, aid in understanding RWI and no seller indemnity transactions.
i.

History of RWI

RWI has become more popular in recent years due to the rise in
private equity transactions, lower RWI policy premiums, and expanded
RWI coverage.26 The RWI underwriting process formerly caused
significant delays in a transaction but a policy can now be finalized in as
little as two weeks.27 RWI is most commonly used in private company
M&A transactions worth at least $50 million, including transactions worth
over $1 billion.28 While RWI started out as a way to supplement the seller’s
indemnity,29 it is now sometimes used to significantly reduce or entirely
replace the seller’s indemnity.30

Cable, supra note 9, at 83–84.
Id. at 85, 87.
28 Griffith, supra note 2, at 1864–65.
29 See Stephen Leitzell, Representations and Warranties Insurance: No Longer Optional for
Strategic Buyers, DEAL LAWS., May–June 2021, at 1, 1,
https://www.dechert.com/content/dam/dechert%20files/people/bios/ l/stephenleitzell/Representations-And-Warranties-Insurance-Stephen-Leitzell.pdf. RWI is still
more commonly used in conjunction with the traditional seller’s indemnity. See Griffith,
supra note 2, at 1866. However, this article focuses on the less common “no seller
indemnity” variety of RWI.
30 Griffith, supra note 2, at 1866 (“Survey respondents reported that roughly one third
of recent RWI policies were written to cover deals in which there was no seller
indemnity.”); see also Brian Keeler, Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, Representations and
Warranties Insurance in M&A Transactions, BLOOMBERG LAW (Mar. 2020),
https://www.morganlewis.com//media/files/news/2020/representationsandwarrantiesin.pdf.
26
27
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Purpose for using RWI

RWI has become a staple in the M&A industry. The seller likes
RWI because it provides a way to reduce its post-closing liability.31 RWI is
attractive to the buyer because of its capacity to make the buyer a more
competitive bidder in a seller’s market. 32 RWI is especially popular when
the buyer is a private equity firm and the seller or the seller’s management
intend to have a managerial role or some other business relationship with
the acquired business after the closing.33
iii.

Obtaining a RWI policy

Typically, RWI is purchased as a “buy-side” policy with the parties
allocating the premium as part of the transaction costs.34 The buyer

Leitzell, supra note 29, at 3–4 (“Sellers of businesses, familiar with the product
through their own buy-side activity, whether as strategic sellers or private equity owners
themselves, have increasingly taken the view that they will only sell to a buyer willing to
use RWI in order to eliminate or at least minimize their post-closing exposure.”);
Griffith, supra note 2, at 1920 (“As a substitute for standard indemnity and escrow
obligations, RWI allows sellers to minimize risk at exit. RWI may also provide value to
private equity buyers by preventing managerial risk aversion in the selection of portfolio
company investments.”).
32 See Leitzell, supra note 29 at 1, 4 (“[T]he closer the relative bargaining power between
the buyer and the seller in any deal, the more likely that the seller will require RWI in
order to limit its post-closing exposure, and the more likely that the buyer will have to
agree.”). The usage of RWI has become so commonplace that sellers sometimes prequalify the target company and provide coverage options to potential buyers. Keeler,
supra note 30.
33 Leitzell, supra note 29, at 5 (explaining that a no seller indemnity is the easiest way to
provide a seller with a clean break); Cable, supra note 9, at 95 (“Often, a buyer,
especially in the private-equity context, expects the seller to continue in a management
capacity. It can be awkward to assert a claim in that circumstance, and it may be easier
to bring a claim against an insurance company.”); Keeler, supra note 30, at 4 (“RWI can
help avoid putting the buyer to a choice between suing its management team or
forgoing a portion of the buyer’s losses.”).
34 See Keeler, supra note 30, at 3.
31
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commonly uses a broker to solicit bids for the RWI policy.35 The buyer
and the insurer, through their respective legal counsel, negotiate the terms
of the policy.36 The insurance broker may also assist with the negotiation.37
The insurer charges an underwriting fee of $25,000 to $50,000 to pay for
the legal counsel retained for this negotiation process.38
The underwriting process relies heavily on the diligence conducted
by the buyer.39 The underwriter may review documents provided in
response to due diligence requests as well as reports prepared by the
buyer’s various advisors.40 Finally, the underwriter conducts a diligence call
with the buyer to discuss any identified areas of risk.41 The policy may
contain exclusions based on this diligence.42

Cable, supra note 9, at 85 (“Several insurance brokerage firms maintain teams
primarily dedicated to RWI. These brokers are often former M&A lawyers.”).
36 Id. at 86–87 (commenting that while the terms of any individual policy are subject to
negotiation, “market conventions are emerging” with respect to certain policy features).
37 Id. at 88 (“Brokers maintain relationships with insurers and so may have influence
with them.”).
38 Id. at 98 (noting that underwriters keep a small staff and typically hire outside counsel
to help review diligence and draft exclusions to the policy).
39 See id. at 94 (“Underwriters themselves do not necessarily have the personnel to
effectively diligence a large M&A transaction in the time provided.”).
40 Id. at 91 (“[U]nderwriters sign a letter acknowledging that the reports cannot be the
legal basis for a claim by the underwriter against the advisor.”).
41 Id. at 92 (“Underwriters are looking for a disconnect between a seller’s operations
and risk profile and the buyer’s diligence.”).
42 Id. (“If the insurer cannot get comfortable with the scope and quality of the buyer’s
diligence on a particular matter, the insurer might limit the scope of coverage through
writing out language in a representation or creating a new policy exclusion.”).
35
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A RWI policy is commonly limited to 10% of the transaction’s
value.43 A typical premium is around 3% of the policy limit.44 Claims are
subject to a retention (or deductible) of approximately 1% of the
transaction value.45 Of course, the terms of any given policy may vary. A
2016 transaction between Bobcat North America, LLC and Inland Waste
Holdings, LLC worth $64.9 million offers a good example.46 The RWI
policy at issue had a $10 million limit (15% of transaction value) subject
to a $649,000 deductible (1% of transaction value).47 The cost of the
premium was $400,000 (4% of the policy limit).48
iv.

Filing a Claim under the RWI policy

The claims process under a RWI policy is similar to the
indemnification procedure under a purchase agreement.49 The
policyholder provides notice of a claim to the insurer, who either issues
payment or disputes the claim.50 Claims are paid out subject to the

Griffith, supra note 2, at 1868 (“Limits anchor around 10%, one insurer remarked,
because the purpose was ‘to replace the seller escrow that used to predominate 5–10
years ago.’”).
44 Id. at 1867; see also Cable, supra note 9, at 84 (noting premiums typically “equal [] 2.53% of the coverage amount”).
45 Griffith, supra note 2, at 1867–68.
46 Bobcat N. Am., LLC v. Inland Waste Holdings, LLC, No. N17C-06-170 PRW
CCLD, 2020 WL 55876883 at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 18, 2020) (involving the sale of
several waste-management companies).
47 Id. at *3.
48 Id.
49 Griffith, supra note 2, at 1895.
50 Id.
43
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and the policy limits.51 In many cases, the

buyer and seller allocate the cost of the retention through an escrow
agreement.52 However, in a no seller indemnity deal, only the buyer is
responsible for paying the retention amount.53
Insurers use coverage defenses to mitigate the risk of fraud and
misinformation provided by either the buyer or the seller.54 If the buyer
provided false information during the underwriting process, the insurer
may seek to rescind the policy to avoid coverage.55 If the insurer pays out
claims related to the fraud of the seller, it might assert its subrogation
rights.56 While claims for rescission and subrogation are not common, the
existence of these rights are tools that may be used by an insurer to bargain
for a discounted claim settlement.57

See Cable, supra note 9, at 84; see also Griffith, supra note 2, at 1909–10 (stating that
“most claims settle within the retention[,]” making this a very profitable industry for
insurers)
52 Leitzell, supra note 29, at 2.
53 Id.
54 Griffith, supra note 2, at 1915–16.
55 Id. at 1916.
56 Id.; see also Louis Matthews & Steve Wright, Impact of a Buy-Side Representations and
Warranties Insurance Policy on the Acquisition Agreement, 1 M & A PRACTICE GUIDE § 18.07
(Jonathan Whalen ed., 2022) (noting that the treatment of fraud in the agreement will
also govern the insurer’s subrogation claim); Keeler, supra note 30, at 6 (“[F]or purposes
of the RWI policy [fraud] will have the same meaning as it does in the underlying
acquisition agreement.”).
57 Griffith, supra note 2, at 1917 (“An insurer that can credibly threaten to exclude,
rescind, or subrogate may be able to settle RWI claims at a substantial discount.”).
51
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III. FRAUD CLAIMS WHEN THERE IS NO SELLER INDEMNITY
While post-closing fraud claims are not unique to

no seller

indemnity transactions, they are increasingly asserted by buyers in this
context to recover damages in excess of the limits of the RWI policy.58 A
buyer experiencing unusually large damages or losses in connection with
a breach will look for other means to make itself whole. Even if the buyer’s
sole remedy is the RWI policy, it still may be able to assert a fraud claim,
depending on how the parties have defined fraud in the purchase
agreement.
While the buyer would like to preserve as much post-closing fraud
liability as possible, the seller, of course, would prefer to complete the
transaction with few or no strings attached.59 After all, the purchase price
was likely computed, in part, based on the post-closing liability scheme
agreed to by the parties.60 Moreover, defending even an unfounded

Noreuil & Massengill, supra note 24 (“Once the representations and warranties
insurance policy limits are exhausted, buyers are increasingly bringing fraud claims
against sellers to seek to recover the remaining alleged damages because fraud claims
are the only remaining claims permitted under the typical purchase agreement.”).
59 Express Scripts, Inc. v. Bracket Holdings Corp., 248 A.3d 824, 831 (Del. 2021) (“The
seller wants to limit its liability for post-closing disputes over representations and
warranties.”).
60 Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1035 (Del. Ch.
2006) (arguing that the buyer, a sophisticated party, should be held to the deal and a
“voluntarily-accepted limitation on its remedial options”); Id. at 1052 (“The Seller
contends that a deal between sophisticated parties with the free right to walk away is a
deal, and the law of this State should honor it.”).
58
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allegation of fraud poses significant costs to the seller, both financially and
reputationally.61
While the parties cannot eliminate post-closing fraud claims
entirely, they may draft provisions in the asset purchase agreement to
address these concerns. The parties may negotiate for and include various
contract provisions to allocate the risk of post-closing fraud claims.
Delaware decisional law illustrates the acceptable bounds within which the
parties may allocate this risk without running afoul of public policy.
A.

POST-CLOSING FRAUD CLAIMS

There are two competing policies when it comes to fraud claims
stemming from contractual relations. On the one hand, Delaware law
favors freedom of contract.62 On the other hand, the law disfavors fraud,63
61 Id. at 1061 (“If the Seller, a private equity firm, gets a rap as a fraudster who tries to
sell portfolio companies based on false representations, that Seller will pay a price.”);
Fridrikh V. Shrayber & Morgan J. Hanson, Anti-Reliance Clauses and Other Contractual
Fraud Limitations Under Delaware Law, 25 WIDENER L. REV. 23, 26 (2019) (“Even if a
fraud claim is ultimately dismissed or otherwise resolved before trial, a [seller] may
nevertheless feel the negative reputational effects stemming from contemporaneous
publicity about the lawsuit and its allegations.”); see also Abry Partners V, L.P., 891 A.2d
at 1058. (“[C]ourts are not perfect in distinguishing meritorious from non-meritorious
claims of fraud.”).
62 Express Scripts, Inc., 248 A.3d at 830. (“There is also ‘a strong American tradition of
freedom of contract, and that tradition is especially strong in [Delaware], which prides
itself on having commercial laws that are efficient.”) (alteration in original);
ChyronHego Corp. v. Wight, No. CV 2017-0548-SG, 2018 WL 3642132 at *1 (Del. Ch.
July 31, 2018) (“Our law supports freedom of contract, holding parties to their
bargains, good and bad.”).
63 ChyronHego Corp., 2018 WL 3642132 at *1. (“[O]ur law abhors fraud, which is inimical
to free exchange, properly understood.”); Aveanna Healthcare, LLC v. Epic/Freedom,
LLC, No. N20C-08-055 AML CCLD, 2021 WL 3235739, at *12 (Del. Super. Ct. July
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as “[t]he public policy against fraud is a strong and venerable one that is
largely founded on the societal consensus that lying is wrong.”64
Delaware’s compromise is to allow parties to contract away liability for
fraud based on extra-contractual representations—statements and
information not contained in the asset purchase agreement itself—and for
contractual misrepresentations that are not intentionally made.65
i.

Elements of Common Law Fraud

While there are different types of fraud, this article primarily refers
to common law fraud involving contractual representations and warranties
in an asset purchase agreement.66 To state a claim for

fraud under

Delaware common law:
[T]he plaintiff must plead facts supporting
an inference that: (1) the defendant falsely
represented or omitted facts that the
defendant had a duty to disclose; (2) the
defendant knew or believed that the
representation was false or made the
representation with a reckless indifference
to the truth; (3) the defendant intended to
induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from
acting; (4) the plaintiff acted in justifiable

29, 2021) (“In Delaware, contractual freedom ends where attempts to ‘immunize’
contractual fraud begin.”).
64 Abry Partners V, L.P., 891 A.2d at 1035.
65 Id.
66 See, e.g., Glenn D. West, That Pesky Little Thing Called Fraud: An Examination of
Buyers’ Insistence Upon (and Sellers’ Too Ready Acceptance of) Undefined “Fraud
Carve-Outs” in Acquisition Agreements, 69 BUS. LAW. 1049, 1066–67 (2014)
(differentiating equitable fraud, promissory fraud, and unfair dealings-based fraud from
common law fraud).
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reliance on the representation; and (5) the
plaintiff was injured by its reliance.67
In sum, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant made a false
representation, either knowingly or with reckless indifference as to its
truthfulness, with the intention

of inducing

the plaintiff to act, and

that the plaintiff was injured when it justifiably relied upon that
representation.68
One

instance in which a buyer might assert a fraud claim is

when the seller knowingly conceals the loss of a major customer so the
buyer will not pull out of the transaction.69 For example, in Swipe Acquisition
Corporation v. Krauss, the parties entered into an agreement in which Swipe
Acquisition Corporation would purchase PLI Holdings, Inc., a company
that makes and distributes gift cards.70 One of PLI’s most important
customers was First Data Corp.71 Through this relationship with First
Data Corp., PLI became the gift card supplier for Amazon.com.72 This
indirect relationship with Amazon was discussed at length during the

67 Abry Partners V, L.P., 891 A.2d at 1050 (citing DCV Holdings, Inc. v. Conagra, Inc.,
889 A.2d 954, 958 (Del. 2005)).
68 Id.
69 Swipe Acquisition Corp. v. Krauss, No. CV 2019–0509–PAF, 2020 WL 5015863, at
*1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2020).
70 Id. at *1, 3.
71 Id. at *2
.
72 Id.
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purchase negotiations, and the seller gave assurances that Amazon would
be a longstanding customer.73
While the parties were still negotiating the terms of the purchase
agreement, the seller learned that the company would be losing Amazon’s
business.74 Fearful that the transaction would fall through if the buyers
learned of the loss, the seller purposefully and actively concealed this bad
news during the diligence process and failed to update its financial
projections to reflect the impending loss of business.75 The seller never
informed the buyer of this critical information, and the transaction
proceeded to closing.76
Shortly after closing, the buyer learned of the loss of Amazon’s
business and filed claims for breach of contract and for common law
fraud, premising its fraud claim on the following false representation:
No PLI Company has received any notice
or has any knowledge that . . . any entity
identified in Schedule 3.21 (each, a “Major
Indirect Customer”) has ceased or
substantially reduced, or will or intends to
cease or substantially reduce, use of,
demand for, or the price it will pay for, any
products or services of the Company or its
Subsidiaries that are indirectly provided to

Id.
Id.
75 Id. at *3.
76 Id.
73
74
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such Major Indirect Customer, including
by any Major Customer.77
The buyer presented evidence that the seller knew this representation was
false three weeks prior to signing the purchase agreement.78 Because the
seller had knowingly made a false representation in the purchase
agreement to induce the buyer to close the transaction, the buyer was able
to state a proper claim for fraud.79
ii.

Fraud Based on Extra-Contractual Representations

Delaware law allows parties to contract away liability for false
representations made outside the four corners of an asset purchase
agreement.80 One of the elements of common law fraud is that the
claimant justifiably relied on the representation.81 When parties utilize an
anti-reliance provision, they declare that they are not relying on
information outside the four corners of the agreement.82 Therefore, even
if one party knowingly makes false statements, if those statements are not
part of the agreement, “the complaining party cannot, in light of the

Id. at *5.
Id.
79 Id. at *10.
80 Aveanna Healthcare, LLC v. Epic/Freedom, LLC, No. N20C-08-055 AML CCLD,
2021 WL 3235739, at *13 (Del. Super. Ct. July 29, 2021).
81 Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1050 (Del. Ch.
2006) (citing DCV Holdings, Inc. v. Conagra, Inc., 889 A.2d 954, 958 (Del. 2005)).
82 ChyronHego Corp. v. Wight, No. CV 2017–0548–SG, 2018 WL 3642132 at *1 (Del.
Ch. July 31, 2018).
77
78
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contractual provision, have reasonably relied on the prior false
statements.”83
iii.

Fraud Based on Representations and Warranties in the Purchase
Agreement
Delaware treats fraud based on contractual representations

differently from fraud based on extra-contractual representations.
“Contractually binding, written representations of fact ought to be the
most reliable of representations, and a law intolerant of fraud should abhor
parties that make such representations knowing they are false.”84
However, Delaware does allow parties to contract away liability for
contractual misrepresentations that are made unintentionally,85 as the law
distinguishes between lies and unintentional misrepresentations.86 In other
words, while the parties may not contract away liability for intentional
fraud, they may place limits on liability for misrepresentations that are
made recklessly or negligently.87

Id.
Abry Partners V, L.P., 891 A.2d at 1057.
85 Id. at 1035 (“In other words, parties may allocate the risk of factual error freely as to
any error where the speaking party did not consciously convey an untruth.”).
86 Id. at 1062 (“[T]here is a moral difference between a lie and an unintentional
misrepresentation of fact. . . . There is also a practical difference between lies and
unintentional misrepresentations. A seller can make a misrepresentation of fact because
it was misinformed by someone else, was negligent, or even was reckless.”).
87 Express Scripts, Inc. v. Bracket Holdings Corp., 248 A.3d 824, 830 (Del. 2021)
(acknowledging that while a party may not limit exposure for conscious lies to the
buyer, it may place limits on liability for reckless, grossly negligent, or negligent
behavior).
83
84
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For example, in Express Scripts, Inc. v. Bracket Holdings Corp., the
sellers engaged in fraud by recklessly inflating revenue and working
capital.88 The buyer recovered $13 million under the RWI policy (its sole
recourse under the exclusive remedies clause in the purchase agreement)
and then prevailed on a fraud claim in the Superior Court.89 The jury
awarded over $82 million.90 The award was reversed on appeal because the
jury had been instructed about recklessness when the purchase agreement
limited the seller’s liability to “deliberate” fraud.91 The court stated that
“[a] deliberate state of mind is a different kettle of fish than a reckless
one.”92
B.

CONTRACT PROVISIONS USED TO ALLOCATE THE RISK OF POSTCLOSING FRAUD CLAIMS
Parties to asset purchase agreements use various contract

provisions to allocate the risk of post-closing fraud claims. Delaware
“respect[s] the ability of sophisticated businesses . . . to make their own
judgments about the risk they should bear and the due diligence they
undertake, recognizing that such parties are able to price factors such as

Id. at 826.
Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 834.
92 Id. at 826.
88
89

46

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 24

limits on liability.”93 The integration and anti-reliance clauses in an asset
purchase agreement are used to contract away liability for extracontractual misrepresentations, while the exclusive remedies clause and
the fraud carve-out are used to allocate liability for contractual
misrepresentations.94
i.

Integration Clause

One important way the parties allocate risk is through an
integration clause.95 An integration clause provides that the asset purchase
agreement is the entire agreement between the parties as to the asset
purchase and that it supersedes any prior representations, warranties, and
agreements relating to the asset purchase.96 Side agreements, oral
statements, or due diligence not incorporated into the agreement cannot
constitute contractual representations when there is an integration
clause.97

Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1061 (Del. Ch.
2006).
94 Id. at 1058–59.
95 Id. at 1058 (“This sort of definition minimizes the risk of erroneous litigation
outcomes by reducing doubts about what was promised and said, especially because the
contracting parties have defined that in writing in their contract.”).
96 HARRISON, supra note 4, at 109–10.
97 Id. at 109.
93
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Anti-Reliance Clause

An integration clause alone, however, will not relieve a party of
extra-contractual fraudulent representations.98 The contract must also
contain clear anti-reliance language.99 An anti-reliance clause is an
affirmative declaration made by the buyer that it did not rely on extracontractual representations in its decision to sign the agreement.100 This
clause, in effect, “prohibits the promising party from reneging on its
promise by premising a fraudulent inducement claim on statements of fact
it had previously said were neither made to it nor had any effect on it.”101
An anti-reliance clause is a way to disclaim potential fraud claims for
inaccurate or incomplete statements made outside the contract.102

Abry Partners V, L.P., 891 A.2d at 1059 (“[M]urky integration clauses, or standard
integration clauses without explicit anti-reliance representations, will not relieve a party
of its oral and extra-contractual fraudulent representations.”).
99 Id. (“If parties fail to include unambiguous anti-reliance language, they will not be
able to escape responsibility for their own fraudulent representations made outside of
the agreement’s four corners.”); see also Anschutz Corp. v. Brown Robin Cap., LLC, No.
CV 2019-0710-JRS, 2020 WL 3096744 at *13 (Del. Ch. June 11, 2020) (“A standard
integration clause, without more, is insufficient to disclaim all reliance on extracontractual statements.”).
100Aveanna Healthcare, LLC v. Epic/Freedom, LLC, No. N20C-08-055 AML CCLD,
2021 WL 3235739, at *13 (Del. Super. Ct. July 29, 2021) (“[P]arties eliminate ‘extracontractual’ fraud claims while preserving ‘intra-contractual’ fraud claims.”); see, e.g.,
Abry Partners V, L.P., 891 A.2d at 1035 (“[T]he Buyer has accepted that it had promised
that the only representations of fact it was relying upon and the only representations of
fact made to it were contained within the Agreement itself, and that this court’s
jurisprudence will hold it to that promise.”).
101 Abry Partners V, L.P., 891 A.2d at 1056.
102 Mergers & Acquisitions, A.B.A.: Bus. Law Section, supra note 3 (interviewing Tali
Sealman).
98
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On the other hand, if the agreement does not “actually include a
specific acknowledgement by a party that it is only relying on information
contained within the four corners of the agreement, that party is not
shirking its bargain when it later alleges that it did, in fact, rely on extracontractual representations.”103 For example, in Anschutz Corporation v.
Brown Robin Capital, LLC,104 the buyer brought a claim for fraudulent
inducement based on representations made outside the four corners of
the purchase agreement.105 The Chancery Court denied the seller’s motion
to dismiss because the purchase agreement did not contain an adequate
anti-reliance clause.106 In fact, the purported anti-reliance language actually
served to bolster the buyer’s claim. The relevant portion of the agreement
read as follows:
Buyer acknowledges and agrees that it has
made its own inquiry and investigation
into, and, based thereon, has formed an
independent judgment concerning, the
Company and its business operations, and
that it has been provided with such
information about the Company and its
business and operations as it has
requested.107

Anschutz Corp., 2020 WL 3096744 at *14.
Id. at *1.
105 Id. at *13.
106 Id. at *15.
107 Id. at *14.
103
104
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Keep in mind that the seller had disclaimed any express or implied
representations or warranties other than those within the agreement, and
that the agreement also contained a standard integration clause.108
However, because the buyer had not made an express acknowledgment of
anti-reliance, it was not barred from bringing an extra-contractual fraud
claim.109
Well-drafted anti-reliance clauses work together with carefully
written integration clauses to preclude liability for extra-contractual fraud.
It is, therefore, essential that a buyer obtain appropriately tailored
representations and warranties in the purchase agreement. The drafting of
a purchase agreement could be compared to the working of a puzzle in
the shape of the business being acquired.110 The seller supplies various
puzzle pieces pursuant to the buyer’s request.111 Once the buyer is satisfied
with the picture, it stops requesting pieces, and the transaction closes.112
The buyer cannot then “construct a fraud claim upon the notion that it

Id.
Id. at *14–15.
110 Pilot Air Freight, LLC v. Manna Freight Sys., Inc., No. CV 2019-0992-JRS, 2020
WL 5588671, at *23 (Del. Ch. Sept. 18, 2020).
111 Id.
112 Id.
108
109
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needed more, or different, pieces in the [asset purchase agreement] to see
the full picture. Aggressive bargaining is not fraud.”113
The buyer can protect itself from reliance upon important
information obtained outside the agreement by weaving that information
into the representations and warranties by express reference in the
agreement, or through its inclusion in the related disclosure schedules.114
For example, in Aveanna Healthcare v. Epic, the buyer relied heavily on
financial performance analyses and documentation prepared by various
advisors of the seller.115 Those reports survived closing as part of “the
contractually-defined and incorporated ‘Financial Statements.’”116 As
such, false statements in the reports were incorporated by express
reference into the agreement itself, and fraud claims based on those
statements would not be barred by anti-reliance language.117
iii.

Exclusive Remedies Provision and the Fraud Carveout

The exclusive remedies provision provides that a buyer must
pursue damages according to the agreed upon indemnification provisions
instead of pursuing other contract or tort-based claims that may be
Id.
Mergers & Acquisitions Comm., A.B.A., Fraud Carve-Outs: Drafting, HOTSHOT,
www.hotshotlegal.com/courses/fraud-carve-outs-drafting/sections/932 (interviewing
Tali Sealman) (last visited Oct. 29, 2022).
115 Aveanna Healthcare, LLC v. Epic/Freedom, LLC, No. N20C-08-055 AML CCLD,
2021 WL 3235739, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. July 29, 2021).
116 Id.
117 Id. at *12.
113
114
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available for the same issue.118 In a transaction that utilizes RWI, the
insurance is often the exclusive remedy, except in a case of fraud or with
regard to fundamental representations. For example, in Express Scripts v.
Bracket Holdings Corp., the purchase agreement contained the following
language in its indemnification section:
THE BUYER AND PARENT EACH
ACKNOWLEDGES AND AGREES
THAT EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF ANY
DELIBERANT [sic] FRAUDULENT (I)
ACT, (II) STATEMENT, OR (III)
OMISSION (1) THE SOLE AND
EXCLUSIVE REMEDY OF WITH
RESPECT TO ANY BREACH BY
PARENT
OR
ANY
REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY
(OTHER
THAN
THE
FUNDAMENTAL
REPRESENTATIONS) CONTAINED
IN THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE
SATISFIED FROM THE R & W
INSURANCE POLICY . . . .119
Most transactions utilize some type of fraud carve-out to the
exclusive remedies provision.120 Nevertheless, even when the parties omit
a fraud carveout, the court may read in a common law fraud carve-out.121

HARRISON, supra note 4, at 268.
Express Scripts, Inc. v. Bracket Holdings Corp., 248 A.3d 824, 830 (Del. 2021)
(emphasis added).
120 Summary: Fraud Carve-Outs, supra note 8, at 1.
121 Id. at 5. (“[U]nder Delaware law, even if the parties don’t include a fraud carve-out
in the exclusive remedies provision, a buyer could still bring a tort-based claim if they
believe the seller knowingly lied in the written reps.”).
118
119
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The Danger of an Undefined Fraud Carveout

An undefined fraud carve-out is often found within the exclusive
remedies provision and consists of the following sparce language
modifying the parties’ acknowledgement of the exclusive remedy: “except
in the case of fraud.”122 This type of carve-out is buyer-friendly and may
be more broad than the parties intended.123 For example, a court might
determine that the parties intended the exclusion to apply to both
contractual and extra-contractual representations, essentially voiding the
integration and anti-reliance clauses.124 Under this result, the seller would
be subject to more liability than if the court simply enforced the public
policy carveout.125
b.

Limiting the Scope of the Fraud Carveout by Defining Fraud
In most cases, the parties intend for a fraud carve-out to apply

when a seller knowingly makes a material false representation that the

Mergers & Acquisitions Comm., A.B.A.: Bus. Law Section, Summary: Fraud CarveOuts: Drafting, HOTSHOT, [hereinafter Summary: Fraud Carve-Outs: Drafting],
https://www.hotshotlegal.com/courses/fraud-carve-outs-drafting/sections/932
(follow “Summary” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 29, 2022).
123 West, supra note 66, at 1054 (“[A] fraud carve-out that does not qualify the term
‘fraud’ with the specific type of fraud to which one is intending to refer may well be a
carve-out that captures more than the egregious conduct intended to be captured.”);
Summary: Fraud Carve-Outs, supra note 8, at 1–2 (“Buyers prefer either no definition at all
or a broader definition that includes misstatements made both in and outside of the
agreement . . . .”).
124 See Summary: Fraud Carve-Outs, supra note 8, at 4 (“When fraud is left undefined in the
carve-out, there could be a conflict between the No-Reliance clause and the carve-out.
This can raise questions about whether both contractual and extra-contractual
representations should be allowed as the basis of a fraud claim.”).
125 Id. at 5.
122
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buyer relies upon.126 Sellers should, therefore, insist on “limit[ing] the
scope of the fraud carve-out to a defined set of circumstances where the
sellers deliberately included a representation in the agreement knowing it
was false.”127 The parties may define fraud within the carveout itself or in
a defined term.128 An example of a more seller-friendly provision is as
follows:
Except in the case of claims of intentional
common law fraud respecting the express
representations and warranties set forth in this
Agreement and asserted against the Person
who knowingly committed such intentional
common law fraud, claims for
indemnification brought in accordance
with and subject to this Article [ ] shall be
the sole and exclusive remedy of any
Indemnitee for Losses from and after the
Closing Date with respect to any claim
arising from, based upon, or related to this
Agreement (whether in contract or tort).129
Along similar lines, the exclusive remedies provision litigated in
the Express Scripts case, mentioned above, provides a carve-out that
excepts any deliberate fraudulent acts, statements, or omissions from the

See id. at 3.
Id. at 1.
128 Summary: Fraud Carve-Outs: Drafting, supra note 124, at 1
129 Id. at 1−2 (emphasis added).
126
127
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exclusive remedies provision.130 In that case, the buyer could recover
damages above the amount of the representations and warranties
insurance policy if the seller committed deliberate fraud, but it was limited
to the remedy provided by the insurance policy if the fraud had been
committed with a lesser state of mind.131
IV. DEFINING FRAUD TO CAPTURE THE PARTIES’ INTENT
The analysis and observations provided in Part III indicate that
transactional lawyers advising on, negotiating, and drafting asset purchase
agreements should be familiar with and pay attention to decisional law
when determining contents of the agreement, including the words used to
define fraud as the term is used in any fraud carve-out from the exclusive
remedies clause. As noted above, undefined fraud carveouts carry a bigger
risk of post-closing liability for the seller because they may be construed
to include reckless or negligent fraud.132 Narrowing fraud to only
intentional acts, however, may preclude a buyer from instigating a cause

Express Scripts, Inc. v. Bracket Holdings Corp., 248 A.3d 824, 830 (Del. 2021)
(emphasis added). The reader will note that there are at least two typographical errors in
this provision, which is quoted in full at supra note 122. First, the word “deliberate” is
misspelled as “deliberant.” Then, in the final sentence, the first “of” is out of place.
While the latter error appears to be insignificant, no doubt the misspelling of
“deliberate” caused the drafting attorneys significant embarrassment during the court
proceedings. Let this be a warning that careless drafting errors are sometimes put on
display for the world (and other lawyers) to see.
131 Id. at 834 (finding that “deliberate” had the same meaning as “intentional” and did
not mean “reckless”).
132 Supra notes 129—34 and accompanying text.
130
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of action against the seller for misrepresentations or omissions, however
egregious, made with lesser states of mind. This tension is one that must
be dealt with openly when the parties are negotiating the terms of the
purchase agreement. Fraud is not something that should be left up to
interpretation—unless the parties expressly agree that they will leave it up
to interpretation.
A.

REVISITING THE MAKEUP TECH HYPOTHETICAL

This part applies the fraud concepts discussed in Part III to the
Makeup Tech hypothetical presented in the Introduction. In the
hypothetical, Smith and the Buyer agreed to a no seller indemnity
transaction. Smith desired to utilize this type of transaction in order to
reduce her post-closing liability so she could complete the transaction
“with no strings attached.” The Buyer agreed in order to make itself a
more competitive bidder, and it was likely able to make a slightly lower bid
in return. The intent of the parties was to substitute a RWI policy for the
typical seller’s indemnity.
The purchase agreement included integration and anti-reliance
clauses thereby precluding a fraud claim based on extra-contractual
misrepresentations. It also provided that the RWI policy would be the
exclusive remedy in the event of a breach of the seller’s contractual
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representations and warranties. However, the agreement included a fraud
carve-out to the exclusive remedies provision allowing the buyer to seek
additional recourse in the event of fraud. Does Smith’s failure to
investigate the contents of the letter amount to the type of fraud that can
be recovered under the fraud carve-out? That depends on how the parties
failed to define or defined fraud. This part compares two possible
scenarios—one in which the parties left fraud undefined, and one in which
they limited the carveout to intentional fraud.
i.

Carveout that Leaves Fraud Undefined

Suppose that the parties included an undefined fraud carveout to
the exclusive remedies provision that reads as follows:
The buyer acknowledges and agrees that
except in the case of fraud, the sole and
exclusive remedy with respect to any
breach of any representation or warranty
(other
than
the
fundamental
representations) contained in this
agreement shall be satisfied from the
representations and warranties insurance
policy.133
Because fraud is left undefined, this carveout is not necessarily limited to
contractual misrepresentations that are intentionally made.134 It leaves up

This language is a modification of the Express Scripts language found at supra note
122.
134 In fact, the buyer might be able to assert other types of fraud claims than the type of
fraud discussed in this article.
133
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to a judge or jury the question of whether Smith’s conduct amounts to
fraud. Her conduct could reasonably be considered grossly negligent,
possibly reckless, and arguably even intentional if the buyer could present
the right facts. An undefined fraud carve-out leads to a lot of uncertainty,
which is something that the contracting parties to an asset purchase
agreement wish to reduce.
ii.

Carveout that Defines Fraud

Now, suppose that the parties included the following fraud
carveout which narrows fraud to only intentional conduct:
The buyer acknowledges and agrees that
except in the case of intentional fraud with
respect to any representation or warranty
expressly contained in this agreement, the sole
and exclusive remedy with respect to any
breach of any representation or warranty
(other
than
the
fundamental
representations) contained in this
agreement shall be satisfied from the
representations and warranties insurance
policy.135
Under this scenario, the buyer would have a more difficult time proving
that Smith intentionally misrepresented that there were no pending or
threatened claims regarding the patent. It is certainly possible that the

This language is a modification of the Express Scripts language found at supra note
122 and the sample language found at supra note 132.
135
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buyer would still prevail. However, this drafting captures the intent of the
parties better and reduces the likelihood of Smith facing liability for
fraudulent misrepresentation. The buyer will prevail only if they can prove
that Smith’s conduct was intentional.
B.

DRAFTING TECHNIQUES USED TO DEFINE FRAUD

As the hypothetical indicates, the outcome of a fraud claim may
be determined, in part, by whether the parties utilized careful contract
drafting principles. There are two main ways to limit the scope of a fraud
carveout in a purchase agreement—by defining fraud in the carveout itself
or in a defined term. This part discusses those two options and provides
additional ideas for how to deal with fraud in the purchase agreement.
i.

Defining Fraud as a Defined Term

Fraud could be defined in the defined terms section of the
purchase agreement. However, this may have unintended consequences
when fraud has multiple meanings throughout a document. Perhaps the
definition could be stated broadly at first, but then qualified to indicate
that with regard to the exclusive remedies provision, fraud means
intentional common law fraud.
ii.

Drafting a Descriptive Fraud Carve-Out

The parties could specify in the fraud carve-out whether it applies
only to intentional conduct or to lesser states of mind. This seems to be

2022]
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the most straightforward method of dealing with fraud, and it allows the
parties to limit any ripple effects throughout the purchase agreement. For
example, if the parties wish to use a broader definition of fraud in other
parts of the agreement, they could do so while specifying that for purposes
of the fraud carve-out in the exclusive remedies provision, only intentional
fraud will trigger the carve-out.
iii.

Addressing Fraud in the Recitals

The parties could include a recital indicating that it is the intention
of the parties to enter into a no seller indemnity transaction in which the
exclusive remedy is a policy of RWI. The recital would go on to clarify the
parties’

intentions

with

respect

to

contractual

fraudulent

misrepresentations. If the parties intend to create an undefined fraud
carve-out, they could make this explicit in the recital. A recital would be
used in addition to one of the above options in order to clarify the parties’
intentions. However, the parties run the risk of creating an ambiguity
between the recital and the agreement if there are differences between the
two.
iv.

Creating a Special Section of the Agreement to Address Fraud

Finally, the parties could create a special section in the agreement
to deal with fraud. Each part of the agreement that typically contains a
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reference to fraud would cross-reference the special fraud section. That
section would outline all the different ways that fraud could be implicated,
and it would specify whether the conduct must be intentional or whether
the common law definition would apply. This would require the parties to
think through and be intentional about how they treat fraud in every aspect
of their agreement, and it would help to eliminate any ambiguity or
inconsistencies between sections of the agreement.
V. CONCLUSION
When parties intend to complete a no seller indemnity transaction,
it is important that they negotiate and come to an agreement about how
to handle post-closing fraud claims. If the purchase agreement is silent or
unclear about what constitutes the type of fraud that will trigger a remedy
outside of the RWI policy, the court may read in a meaning that the parties
did not intend to create. A lawyer’s job is to capture the intent and wishes
of her client. In the context of a purchase agreement, this intent is best
captured through careful drafting. In the event of a post-closing fraud
claim, a lawyer wants to make sure her client faces no more liability than
the client bargained for during the negotiation process.

